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EMERGING LEGAL PROBLEMS 
OF THE DEEP SEAS AND POLAR REGIONS 
Richard B. Bilder 
The title of this It'cture reflects a 
profound change in the human con-
dition. For, of all the generations of 
Adam, only in our own generation has 
man for the first time become truly 
capable of making the world his own. 
P('rhaps a Martian might sec mor(' 
dearly than ourselves that mali's ltatu-
ral habitat - the environment for 
which we arc physiologically suited -
is Tl'ally a humblr and rrstric.ted OllC. 
Far from being monarchs of all we sur-
vey, our normal state is to crawl like 
crabs on the bed of a great ocean of gas 
-restricted, in fact, to its nonliquid and 
more temperate portions. The vaster 
portions of our planet - the ",eas and 
their depths, the des('rts, tIll' polar 
f('gions, tIl(' sky - are lll'yoncl (hI' 
rt'at'h of our unaided physiologit'al 
capabilities. Thus, in order to leav(' this 
narrow ('nvironmental niche WI' have 
somehow to carry our natural environ-
ment - a solid platform, air, warmth, 
energy sources - with us. And for 
most of the million years or so that 
scientists say man has been around, 
this has been impossible. 
Man's conquest of his world has 
therefore depended on a slow master-
ing of the technology of artificial en-
vironments. Very long ago the first skin 
garments, fire, containers for carrying 
food and water, and primitive shelters 
permitted us to probe in the desert and 
towards the poles. With the first log 
raft we could, in essence, carry the land 
with us onto the surface of the waters, 
making the waters a highway rather 
than a barrier. But from the time of 
those first great inventions to the pres-
ent, a period of perhaps scores of 
thousands of years, much of our planet 
has remained denied to us. 
Viewrd in this context the far-reach-
ing significance of currrnt technologi-
cal achievements becomes apparent. For 
today, in our own moment of time, 
these physiological barriers are finally 
crumbling. Modern technology has now 
made possible our development and 
transportation of complex artificial en· 
vironments capable of sustaining us 
virtually wherevl'r WI' wish - the polar 
rrgions. the vast new world ben('ath the 
seas, the stratosphere, or even the hori-
zons of outer space. 
Our specific concern today, however, 
is with the special legal implications of 
this development. And, surprising, prr-
haps unromantic, as it may seem, there 
are such legal implications. For where-
ever men go and interact with their 
fellows on a continuous basis - be it 
the polar regions, the deserts, the seas, 
their drpths, or outer space - they 
need rules. Whether this human inter-
action is on the very simple level of 
family living or on the complex level 
of the relations brtwern the organized 
aggregates of human beings that we call 
nations, men need some basis for pre-
dicting other people's behavior and 
for resolving controversies if they are 
to rationally order their activities. The 
location of such interaction is irrele-
vant. What is important is that situa-
tions exist which raise the potentiality 
for human conflict and that only rules 
can avoid or minimize the social losses 
which such conflict involves. Thus, as 
man explores and exploits exotic en-
vironments his laws must follow him. 
It is clear, then, that we need rules 
for the polar regions and the deep seas, 
and, of course, for outer space as well 
-rules governing access and permitted 
uses; rules governing exploitation of 
resources; rules governing personal 
conduct and liability; rules for the 
srulement of disputes; in fact, many of 
the great variety of rules that every 
domestic legal system provides. One 
qurstion, of course, is what all of these 
various rules should be. However, in 
the context of our existing international 
legal order, with its characteristic de-
centralization of rulemaking authority 
as between states, there is an even 
more difficult threshold question - the 
question of who is to make such rules. 
Should it be each individual state itself, 
and, j[ so, how is :mch rulemaking 
authority to hr divided and conflicts 
resoh-ed? Or should sprcific rules be 
determined in advance by all interested 
states by international agreement? Or 
should interested states delegate to 
soml.' international organization such 
rulemaking authority? 
The question of who is to make the 
rules may sound abstract, but the 
stakes are real and high, for the answer 
to this question has much to do with 
what the substantive rules, in fact, turn 
out to he. Obviously, differrnt statcs 
may wish diffcrent rules, and a rule 
whirh is good for one state and serves 
its intl.'rests best may work against the 
iull.'rests of anothl.'r. Thus, if we decidl' 
that a particular statl' - for rxampl<-, 
thr Sovirt Union - may lrgitimatl'ly 
make authoritativr rules as to all con-
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duct in a particular area of the derp 
sl'as or polar r('gions, it may weIl 
rstablish rules favoring its own activi-
tiC's and nationals and prcventing 
Aml'ricans or othrr alirns from enter-
in~ the area or rxploiting its rrsonrers. 
Of course. this problrm of who is to 
make the rulrs govrrning rondurt in 
Ihl' 1'In-ironnH'nls i:-: simply OJl(' faeC't 
of tIll' hro:I<II'r prnhll'm of tIll' alloea-
I ion of pmn'r and rull'making ('(HIIIII'-
II'IH'(' amOIl!! :-:tatl':-: in our prl'''I'nl 
world. and solutions wiII nrerssarily 
draw hruvily on establishrd principles 
and prC'crdents. Since you arc probably 
familiar with these' jurisdictional con-
repls from previous lrctures. I will 
simply stn'ss a few points. 
First. emrrgent jurisdictional rules. 
likr all international rules, lend to be a 
resultant of the realitiC's of various 
slales' interests and effeclive power. 
WIJ('IIlI'r th('sl' rulC's an' reaehed !ly 
exprrss agrrrm('nt or hy thr growth of 
custom. they drvelop out of the pres-
sures which each state can bring on 
oth('rs for acceptancr of Ihr rule it 
IwIievrs brst serves its national poliey. 
Various states' actions. as determined 
hy foreign office drcisions. rrflect the 
,"aried stren~th of thl'se pressurrs and 
may. owr time. take on the aura of 
II'~itima("y. Of rourse. it is important 
to renwmhrr that a state's assessment 
of any proposed rule will properly 
wei~h not only its immrdian; intl'rrsts 
hut its long·range interrst as well. Since 
rwry rull' is availahle also to othrrs, 
derisionmakers must kl'ep in mind the 
polPntiality of futurr "mirror-image" 
invoealions of thl' rule hy foreign 
offieials. 
Thus, to understand the legal rrgimes 
which devrlop in the new environmrnts 
WI' must look not only at kgal "rel'e. 
dl'nts involved hUI also at the pe[('l'ivC'd 
inlert'!'ts of tl1l' \"ariou~ ~tatl's cOlleernecl 
ancl thrir willingn('ss and ahility 10 
exert pressure on other states for ac-
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cpptancc or acquicscence in proposed 
rules promoting those interests. The 
rulcs that emerge are often simply ten-
tativc compromises among these com-
pcting prcssur('s. 
Sccond, the importancc of the eon-
c('pt of territory for our purposes is 
Ihat it is. in csscnc('. a shorthanel way 
of <l1I(wal in;! 10 <I parI ielllar ~Iah' pn'-
dominanl ruh'makin;! aUlhorily in <I 
!!('n!!raphieal an'<I. To l'ay Ihal a 1'1all' 
('<III claim krrilory in thl' IU'\\" ('II\'irtlll' 
nH'nll' is 10 say il ('an acquire l'ueh 
prr,dominant jurisdiction, including thc 
right to cxclude others from the arca or 
its uscs. Conversely, to say that an 
I'nvironmcnt is res coml1wnis - com-
mon prOflerty not subjcct to territorial 
acquisition - is to deny the possibility 
of such overall preclusive national jur-
isdiction. 
But it is worth noting that it is the 
facts of c[cctive rult'making authority 
rather than the words ''I.e lISI' that really 
count. For exam pIc, we tend to think of 
the doctrine that the high seas are res 
communis as a self-evidl'nt truth. How-
evcr, you arc awarl' that this concept 
has really had a rathcr ephl'meral lifc 
- clcarly cslahlishcd hy British sea-
powcr only in. Ihc 19th ('('ntury and al-
ready subjcct to ('ontinual ('rosion m~ 
state intcrests and constcllations of 
pOWl'r haw drastically ehan~ed. Thul'. 
while all states pay lipscrvicc to the 
do('trine of freedom of Ihe scas hy not 
claiming cxpress tcrritorial rights 10 
the high seas, they aceomplish close to 
thl' saml' )"csult hy thl'ir ~rowing num-
h('r of claims to paramount national 
('ontrol of many of the uses of the high 
sca~. Thl' many lypl'S of so·callcd ('XC('P-
tions whi('h havc dcvl'loped - for ex-
ampll" Ill<' ('xpallsion of tl'rrilorial 
wall'rs. law I'nfon·(,lIll'lIt. anel fishinl! 
contip:uous ZOIlI'S; claims to III(' (:olllin-
I'ntal shelves; rlaims 10 I'xdusin' atomic' 
wcapons and missil(~ testin/! arcas; per-
haps ('ven tIl(' Cuhan quarantinc -
mar 1)(' arp:lH'd to 1)(' pro/!rcssiVl'ly <11'-
\'ourillp: tIl(' rlll<,. Whilt, il is tnl<' Ihat 
jH'a(,l'ful nayip:alion an<l fi~hing righls 
arc thus far rl'~pcetcd. WI' must still ask 
how frce thc sl'as really arc toelay. 
Third. in vi('W of the jurisdictional 
significallcc of the eoncl'pt of tl'rritory. 
il is imporlanl for our pllrpOSCS 10 
know l'onH'lhill;! ahoul Ihl' 1'II11'1' II hi('h 
an' ar~IH'd to !!0\"('1"Il ..tailll~ by I'arioll" 
~Iale~ In pn'l·inm .. l~ IIl1approprial('d or 
ulI('la i lIll'd a rea,,; IIIl' II'!!al .ia r~oll f(ll" 
:,-uch unclaimed arcas is tl'rm IIl1l1ill., 
or "no OI1l"S land." Early Icgal doctrin<' 
tended to rcco~ni7.(' ml're discovl'ry of 
such lands and symholic acls, such as 
planting lhl' flag and formal drclara-
lion, as sufficicnl to ground a valid titlr. 
But by the late 19th ccntury states such 
as thc United States were insisting that 
something more was. needed - so-
callcd e[('ctive occupation. Undl'r this 
doclrine the validity of a Slate's claim 
to titlc to terra nullius and to consC'-
qucnt rulemaking authority with rc-
spcct to it was dcpendcnt upon that 
statc's dl'monstrating that it was, in 
fact, capahle of cxcrcisinl!: continuous 
I!:ovcrnml'ntal functions in that area. It 
was argucd Ihat in rclurn for intcrna-
lional )"eeognition of ils claim hy olhcr 
~Ialt'~. a I'laimanl ~hould Iw in a posi-
lion 10 pro\('('t tlH' nalionals and IllI' in-
1I'l'I1alional rip:hl~ of tho:-:t' ollH'r ~tal<'s 
in the area in question. However, whil" 
the grncral standard of c{fcctive occu-
patioll rt'('eivrd gcncral approval, Hev-
<'ral international dccisions - notably 
thosl' in Ihc Palm as I$land. Clipperton 
Isla lid, and Eastern Greenlalld e1lS('S-
havc since sup;~ested lhat wherc the 
pI'I'viously unclaiml'd an'a is inhos· 
pitahl(' and largt'ly IIninhahitl'(1 quill' 
minimal activitirs may mcct the stan-
dal'll of ('[('('Iiv!' O(·I'upalion. Thus. IIII' 
pn'('i~(' rl'lJuin'lIH'nls of IIH' t'IT('('liv(' 
oC('upalion rul<' in <IifT('fin~ ('onlt'xls is 
far from (·It'ar. 
Of (·ollrs!'. l'il\('(' hy tlH' 20th ('('nlury 
III 0:;1 ~il!n i fiC'anL a n'a~ of til!' worlel wer(' 
aln·ady firmly (lc('upit'c1 ano dainll'c1. 
or. in till' C'a~(' of 111(' high ~('as. con-
:-:icl(·r!·el not [('rret nullius hut res com-
11/1ll/is - nol suhject to claim - th(' 
prohl('ms until r('c('ntly s('emed of mon' 
Ilworrtical than practical il!lportance. 
Bul now th('s(' c1oclril\('s anel prt'('('cknts 
011'1' a!!aill Ill'ill~ ilwokl'(1. An' 11\l' 111'\\' 
"11\ ilolln\l'nls 10 I ... rl'~!anll"d a-- rt·.~ 
/"(III/II/ullis. likl' IllI' high "l'as. illl"apahh' 
of approprialion? Or an' Ihl'y ('rm 
lIullius. :,ubjt'('1 10 ('!aim'? :\nd. if (,'rra 
I/llllius, what sort and dcgree of activity 
is sufficirnt to Irgitimatc such exclusive 
claims? 
Let's now look at these different en-
vironments and the legal regimes or 
problems which have emerged. 
The Arctic. The North Polar re-
gion presents the simplest problem 
from the standpoint of international 
law. It is, of course, a vast ocean al-
most completely surrounded by the 
North American, Asian, and European 
contin('nts and by the Island of Green-
land. Only the northern fringes of the 
continents, Greenland, and some scat-
tered harren islands offer a solid plat-
form for human habitation or exploita-
tion. Although some one million people 
live within the Arctic Circle and the 
Arctic has considerable potential living 
and mineral resources, the actual ex· 
ploitation of the area is presently lim-
ited. On the other hand, the geographic 
position of the North Polar region and 
its potential use as a highway makes it 
of great strategic and commercial sig-
nificance, for the shortest air and sea 
routes between the world's most densely 
populated, economically advanced, and 
militarily powerful countries pass 
through the North Polar region. For 
commercial aircraft, Jmbmarines, and 
missiles alike, the Polar route is the 
quickest way between Europe and Asia 
and North America. The feasibility of 
submarine navigation beneath the 
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polar ice was demonstrated when the 
Nautilus reached the North Pole in 
1958. It is worth noting that a sub· 
marine traveling under the polar ice 
from London to Tokyo needs to 'travel 
only about half the distance of present 
surface ships. The Soviet Union has 
devoted considerable effort ~o Arctic 
activities and has developed a northern 
!'ea route acro!'s Ih(' top of Asia which 
it announc('d last March would be open 
to foreign ships on a toll basis; how-
ever, it is reported tha~ only one Rus-
sian commercial vessel has so far used 
the route and this for ,demonstration 
purposes. 
As to the Arctic Ocean itself, there 
s('rms to be general agreement that the 
traditional law of the sea is fully 
applicable. This result is not surprising, 
in view of the clearly oceanic character 
of the area, the strength of the legal 
precedents involved, the limited possi-
hility of exercising exclusive control, 
and the traditional shared inter('st of 
all neighboring countries in nonexclu-
sive access to the r('gion's principal use 
as a highway. From the time that the 
United States politely declined to en-
dorse Admiral Peary's purported an-
nexation of the North Pole until the 
present, there appears to have bren 
broad agreement that neither the Arc-
tic Ocean itself nor, in particular, the 
pack of floating jce upon it are capable 
of exclusive national appropriation. 
United States and Soviet aircraft, ice-
breakers, submarines, and United 
States and Soviet scientific parties 
hased on floating ice Boes have, on 
many occasions, transited the Arctic 
Ocean without protest. 
A very recently reported incident 
hoth evidences this general principle 
and at the same timn indicates the 
special l('gai problems which may 
nevertheless emerge. This summer two 
U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers, Edisto 
and Eastwind, undertook the first cir-
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cum navigation of the Arctic Ocean and 
proceeded with most of their voyage 
without protest from any state. Their 
route was planned so as to pass well 
outside any state's territorial waters. 
However, in late August the ships were 
blocked by heavy ice in the Kara Sea 
and the United States, through our 
Moscow Embassy, informed the Sovie>ts 
that the ships woulo have 10 pass 
through Vilkitski Strait, which lie>s be-
tween the Soviet island of Severnaya 
Zemlya and the Chelyuskin Peninsula 
of Siberia and comlC'cts the Kara and 
Laptev Seas. The Soviet Government 
took the position that such passage 
would violate Soviet frontiers stating 
that, since it claims a 12-mile territorial 
zone, the 22-mile-wide straits arc 
wholly Soviet waters. Faced with 
Soviet objections and the consequent 
impossibility of proceeding, the United 
States cancelled the expedition. How-
ever, we sent a stiff note of protest to 
the Soviets, pointing out that the Rus-
sian action appeared to be a violation 
of the innocent passage provision of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea, that the ships presented no 
threat to the security and peace of the 
coastal state, and that the Russians had 
frustrated a useful scientific endeavor 
and deprived the international com-
munity of research data of considerable 
significance. 
Let me offer a brief comment. It is 
true that article 16 (4) of the Territo-
rial Sea Convention provides a right of 
innocent passage "through straits 
which are used for international navi-
gation between one part of the high 
seas and another part of the high seas." 
Moreover, the International Court in 
the 1949 Corfu Channel case had pro-
claimed a right of innoce>nt passage> 
through such straits, eve>n as to naval 
vessels, as a matter of customary inter-
national law. The Court, in thal case, 
n'je>ete>d the argument that the passage 
in question must he a "ne>cessary" one 
and held that the convenience of the 
Corfu Strait for international naviga-
tion and the substantial use made' of 
the strait for that purpose were suffi-
cient to place it in the' category of an 
"international highway." Scholarly de-
hale on the Vilkitski Strait incident will 
probably turn on the intere'sting ques-
tion of whe>the>r the Vilkitski Strait can 
really he ("onsidereo one used for "in-
ternational navigation" or as an "inter-
national highway" within the meaning 
of the Convention and Corfu Channel 
casco On the one hand, no United 
States vessel and few Soviet or other 
vessels appear to have previously tran-
sited the Strait. On the other hand, the 
Strait apparently is part of the Sovirt-
proclaimed northern sea route>. Of 
course, Soviet sensitivity to potential 
espionage may well have played a part 
in this incident. But note that despite 
this unhappy occurrence the Soviet 
Government made no claim to restrict 
navigation of the vessels outside its 
territorial waters. 
Legal problems of the Arctic have, 
for the most part, involved territorial 
claims to the various northern islands_ 
For instance, Denmark's claim to 
Greenland by discovery and occupa-
tion was confirmed by the International 
Court in the Eastern Greenland case. 
Norway holds Spitzbergen under the 
terms of an interesting multilateral 
treaty of 1925 which, in some of its 
demilitarization and open-access pro-
V1SlOns, anticipates the Antarctic 
Treaty. And there has been some con-
troversy over Russian claims to 
Wrangel Island. 
But perhaps the most interesting ter-
ritorial issue concerns the so-called sec-
tor daims advanced hy Canada in ] 907 
and tIll! Sovie>t Union in 1926. Undl'r 
this sl'('\or tlH'ory. thl'sl' eOlllltrh's dnim 
title to all An·tie islands lying IlI'twl'('n 
the>ir northern eontirll'nlnl mainltllllls 
and tlJ(' North Poh' situated within the 
mrridians of their most rasterly and 
Wl'Stl'r1y continrlltal boundaries. These 
pie.shaped srctor claims are basrd on 
a rather far-reaching theory of con· 
tiguity and do not depend on actual 
discovery or occupation. None of the 
four othrr nations which border on the 
Arctic Ocran - Norway, Finland, the 
{initrc\ Statl's (by virtue of Alaska), 
lind D('nmark (by virtue of Grernland) 
- r('ro~nizr Ih(' srrtor principle or 
have made claims based on that prin-
ciple. Howevrr, in practice, in view of 
thr pn'srntly limitrd utility of the Arc-
tic islands invol\'('d, the ~rctor·c1aim 
rontro\'('rsy, though unresol\'('d. has 
hrrn of more theoretical than practical 
importance. 
One othrr recent devrlopment per-
haps dr~rrvr~ hrief ml'ntion - Presi-
drnt Ei~rnhower's 1958 "oprn skies" 
propo~al for thr rstablishment of an 
Arctic intrrnational in~peetion zone to 
~uard against surprise attack. Of 
coursr, this proposal came to naught 
when it was vrtoed hy the Sovirt Union 
in thc Unitrd Nations Security Council. 
The Antarctic. The South Polar 
rrgion is, for our purposes, much more 
int('rr~tinA'. Antarctica prrsent~ a 
stron~ rontra~t to thr Arctir - ~co· 
graphically. ~tratcgiral\y. and from thr 
standpoint of thr legal prohlrll1s in· 
volved. It consists principally of a vast 
and drsolatr ice·coverrd continent, as 
large as thr United States and Europe 
comhiIwd, surrounded on every side by 
thou~ancls of miles of hazardous occan, 
ice·filled and impassahle in thr winter 
months. This continent is the coldest, 
drirst. windirst, anel most harrl'n land 
on rarth. Antarctica itself supports vir· 
tually no native animals or plants, 
though th(' offshore watl'rs of thl' An· 
tarctic convrr~rnce tl'rm with sea lif('. 
and prnguins and othrr hirds nl'st on 
the' Antarc·tic coasts. Rrfor(' tIl(' ('nd of 
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World War II only a handful of human 
hl'ings had Sl't foot on thr continent, 
and ('\'('n fewrr had staYl'd through the 
long and harrowing Antarctic wintrr. 
The economic valul' of Antarctica is 
miniscule. No significant mineral ele-
posits or other natural rcsourccs have 
thus far hcpn di~('ovrrrd; in any cvcnt. 
posts of rxploiting and transporting any 
dis('on'rirs would prohahly hr prohihi. 
ti\"('. Othrr usrs whirh ha\'r hrrn suA'-
w's\rd - for rxamplr. tourism or usc 
of thr ('ontinl'nt as a vast ('oM stora!!1' 
wan'hou~r - ~I'rm unlikely to hc im-
portant in the ncar futUre. Moreover, 
in view of the remotcness of the con-
tin!'nt from significant population 
ccntNs and thr fact that the most im· 
portant world powrrs lie in the North-
('TIl rather than the Southern Hemi· 
sphere, Antarctica appears to have little 
potrntial value as a route for transpolar 
air traffic and little strategic signifi-
cance. Thus, it is difficult to see that 
Antarctica naval hases or missile sites 
would really be of much practical use 
to any country. In practice, the prin-
cipal importance of the continent has 
heen in thc area of scientific research, 
as a vast laboratory of vital importance 
to a grrat numh!'r of scientific discip-
Iin('s. 
The limitrd usrfulness of the Ant-
arrt ir has strongly influenrcd prrsent 
intl'rnational treatment of the prohlem 
of territorial and jurisdictional claims. 
From the time that the existence of 
Antarctica was established in the early 
1800's, a number of countries showed 
an intere'st in the area, and by 1956 
sPv('n countries had made extrnsive ter-
ritorial claims covering altogether some 
80 prrcrnt of the continent. These ter-
ritorial claims, hased primarily on 
discovery, symbolic acts, and limited 
t('mporary activitie's hy small expedi-
tions, w('re in many cases conflicting. 
Muny of thci'e countries rrfusrd to 
rt'l:ogniz(' ('uch other's claimi'. The 
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lInil('d Slall'~, drspilr its own very ex-
tensive activities in the Antarctic, 
n('ithrr made territorial claims itself in 
Antarctica nor recognized such claims 
by othrrs. The traditional U.S. position 
was that by its very nature the Ant-
arctic was incapable of that degree of 
rfft'rlive occupation sufficient to sup-
port snch claims of territorial sover-
(,ignty. Thc SO\'irt Union." which hr-
('amI' increasingly activr in Antarctira 
following World War II, also refusrd 
to r('rogni7.(, oth('r statrs' daim~ to trr-
ritory. The r('suIt was lrgal chaos. 
The lcgal qurstions involved became 
practically significant only in the mid-
dlr 1950's. The International Geophysi-
cal Year 1956-58 rrsultrd in a major 
invasion of the continrnt by thousands 
of scientists and supporting military 
and technical personnel of more than 
a dozen countries. This invasion has, in 
the last 10 years, become a conqurst. 
By now advanced trchnology has made 
possible the construction by somr 11 
states of over 30 permanent stations 
throughout the Antarctic, including the 
United States McMurdo, Byrd, South 
Pole, and other stations, and the Soviet 
Vostok and Mirnyy stations. Develop-
ments in sra and airborne logistic sup-
port havr madr possihlr widr-ranging 
rrsrarch acti"itirs and largr-scale con-
tinuing supply of thrse installations; in 
faet, I nndrrstand Ihat the United 
States has this season instituted 
schrduled winter flights hetween New 
Zealand and McMurdo station - a 
considrrahle technical achievement in 
virw of the extremr winter conditions. 
A nurlear reactor is in operation at 
MrMurdo station and others an' con-
templatc(l. Th(' total Antarctic ~ummrr 
population may 1I0W numb('r over 
2.000 prr~ons and til(' winlt'r popula-
tion ov('r 700 - hardly a mrlropolis. 
but c('rtainly a community. 
With dl'\'(·lopn1!'nts 011 this sl'all'_ 
('ollpl('d with Ill(' IJ('('(J:.; of sci('ntists for 
frce acc('ss to rvrry part of th(' Antan'-
tic for thrir rest'arch, the problem of 
national territorial claims for the first 
time hrcamr trouhlcsomr. A modus 
vivendi was established during the ICY 
itst'lf under which daimant states 
avoided intrrfering with each othrr's 
activitirs evrn if they occurrrd within 
daiml'd trrritory. Howrvl-r, when it 
Iwcamr rddl'nt after the IGY that 
substantial activitirs would he continu-
ing indrfinitely_ a morr stahlr Irgal 
arrangemrnt hrcanw drsirahh'. 
Following U.S. initiatin' and cardul 
advance prrparation, a conference of 
the 12 countries most involvrd in the 
Antarctic activitirs was held in 1959 
in Washington. This conferrnce drew 
up the Antarctic Treaty which rnterrd 
into forcr in 1961. The original parties 
wrre Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
South Africa, the Soviet Union, the 
Unitt'd Kingdom, Ih(, Unit(-d Stall-s, 
and Poland. C7.echoslovakia, Denmark. 
land the Netherlands have since 
acceded. 
The Treaty is a remarkable interna-
tional achievement representing, in my 
view, a sensible and practical solution 
to the problC'ms countries arr jointly 
('onfrontrd with in AntarctiC'a. The 
Tr('aty, which is hinding upon the 
partiC's for at lrast ~O yC'ars, is applir-
ahl(' to th(· ar('a south of latitude GO° 
S., including all icc shelves; however, 
rights under international law respect-
ing thl' high seas are not affected. The 
area is both demilitarized and made a 
nuclear-free zonr. Military activitirs of 
any nature, nurlear C'xplosions, and the 
disposal of radioactivr wastes arc pro-
hihitl'd. howrv('r, military )lrr~onnrl 
and (,quipmcnt can be used to supJlort 
srit'ntific rrsearch, and nuclear re-
lwlors lIIay 1)(' II Iii i?;('(I. To ltssllrl' 
ohSt'r\'<IlH'(' of tl\('l'(, provision~, Ih('f(' 
is a p:tlh-hn'akill~ arlirlt' ill lIlt' Tn'tll), 
p('rll1illill~ (,Olllplt·h' fn·(-dom of insp(,('-
tioll; allY party may at allY time 
unilatrrally carry out inspections by 
ground or by aerial surveillance any-
whl're in the Treaty area. The United 
States, in fact, conducted such inspec-
tions, including inspections of Soviet 
stations, in 1964 and 1967, and various 
othrr countries followed suit - al-
though the Soviet Union has not yet 
dOllr ~o. Whill'. of coursr. thl' Treaty 
dOl'S not hind nonpartit's. the partks 
IInd('rtak(' "to (,XNt appropriate dTorts, 
con::,istrnt with th(' Charh'r of thr 
l'nitl'd Nations, to the ('nd that no onr 
rn~ag('s in any activity in Antarctica 
contrary to thl' principles of thr 
Trl'aty." Since the major world pOWl'rs 
are partirs, it is unlikely that non-
partil's would fail to respect the legal 
rl'gime the Treaty creatl's. 
A major prohlem for thr Treaty 
drafters was, of course, that of ter-
ritorial claims and jurisdiction. Even 
though the practical importance of 
th(' areas claimed was slight, the rmo-
tional significancr of such claims to 
ccrtain of the claimant countries was 
gr('at. Consl'qurntly, proposals for com· 
plrte intrrnationalization of Antarctica, 
or at lrast the estahlishment of an inter-
national authority to provide rules for 
the arra, proved impracticable. On the 
other hand. a final determination of the 
many compl'ting positions on claims 
was cll'arly even more out of the ques-
tion. The course taken by the Treaty 
drafters was therefore to bypass this 
complex issue and to dl'al instead with 
the practical asp('cts of sovrrrignty 
rather than its theoretical structure. 
Thus, the Trl'aty says nothing ahout 
the validity of existing claims. Instead, 
it freezes existing positions as they 
were in 1961 and establishes a morato· 
rium on new claims while the Treaty is 
in force. Nothing done by any country 
in Antarctica while the Treaty is in 
forcl' is to aITl'ct thl' validity of such 
claims onr way or the other. On th(' 
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other hand, the most practically signif-
icant incident of such claims, that of 
allocating competence to control con-
chlct, is handlea by providing that ob-
servers carrying on inspections under 
the Treaty, and also exchange scientists, 
are to he subject only to the jurisdiction 
of their state of nationality. Other 
jurisdictional prohlems are to he re-
soh'rd hy consultation. Thus. while it 
r('mains possihlr for claimant states to 
aSSl'rt the right to l'stablish rull's on thl' 
basis of territorial sovrrl'ignty, and 
many have enactl'd laws purportin~ to 
do i'0. most staLes have in practice re-
strictrd thl' application of such rules 
to thl'ir own nationals. Note that so long 
as jurisdictional rights are restricted 
by thl' agreement the issues of terri-
torial claims remain largely theoretical. 
While no formal international organ-
ization is established by the Treaty, it 
provides for extensive scientific co-
oprration and exchange of information 
and for periodic meetings of the 
parties. The participants in these meet-
ings may recommend to their govern-
mrnts so-called agreed measures im-
plementing Treaty purposes, and these 
rrcommendations, when unanimously 
approved hy thl' parties, are interna-
tionally binding. The extent of co-
opl'ration among the parties has been 
remarkable. Important agreed measures 
havr been approved covering problems 
of conservation, telecommunications, 
and scientific cooperation. 
The SUCCl'SS thus far of the Antarc-
tic Trraty in a world of cold war and 
other conflicts is worth noting. A cynic 
might suggest that one reason the 
Trl'aty could be concluded and has 
worked so well is that Antarctica is 
rather useless except for scientific 
research. Scientific research is a use 
which by its very nature stimulates co-
opl'ration and is hostile to the concepts 
of ('xclusin' rulrmaking authority and 
rri'trict('d accrss implicit in l('rrilorial 
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sovereignty. As in thc casc of thc com-
mon interest in free navigation of thc 
high seas, the mutual advantages to 
states of common access for all to all 
areas clearly far outweigh those any 
single state can gain by unduly press· 
ing its own separate interests. More-
over, the drafters wisely bypassed the 
difficult and cmotional theoretical is· 
SII(,S of It'rritorial claims and srttled in-
st('ad the practical functional issues 
necessary to permit the work of scicn-
tific research to go on. 
Thlls, in terms of our concern with 
thr question of who makes thc rulrs, 
whatrver the Antarctic may he in legal 
tlwory, it appears in pr('sent pracliee 
milch like the high seas - a res com-
munis - with each nation controlling 
its own expeditions and nationals. What 
might happen under changed circum-
stances where states find a real stake 
in exclusive claims - for cxample, if 
valuable mineral deposits arc dis· 
covercd - remains to be seen. Hope-
fully thc habits of cooperation and 
functional solution engendered hy thr 
Treaty would engender equally sensible 
new ways of dealing with such devrlop. 
ments. 
As you may know, the success of thl' 
Antarctic Treaty stimulated thr cIt'yel-
opment of the United Nations Outer 
Space Treaty which was largely 
modeled on it. However, the Outrr 
Space Treaty, of course, foreclosrs thr 
incipient problem of territorial claims 
by specifically barring such claims in 
outer space and providing that it is 
to be free for the usc of all. 
Thus, reasonably workahle solutions 
have emerged for handling the presrnt 
iegal problems of the polar regions 
and outrr space - solutions analogous 
to thosc devrIoped in the last century 
for thr high sras. 
The Deep Seas. But when wr turn 
to the deep seas, the prohlrms hrC'omt' 
more trouhlt'somr. For hrTl' we an' not 
talking about harrC'n areas of limited 
practical vallH'. arras in which national 
inteTl'sts are primarily in thr inhrrently 
common and sharahlt' usrs of tran~il 
and scirnlific inn'stigation. Jnst('ad. WI' 
arc d('aling with an emrrging world of 
trem('ndous potential wealth and sig. 
nificancr, on(' in which the rewards of 
('"clusive accrss ancI jurisdiction may 
appl'ar n')"), tC'mJltin~ to stal('s. Sin('t' 
I IIndersland Admiral H('arn will II(' 
diseussin~ Ihis SUhjl'ct in cIt'lail in a 
lalt'1" Il'ctur('. J will limit IIlY~I'lf 10 
sketching out the ollllin('s of tIlt' pro\!· 
lrm. 
Again tl)('se qllt'stions aris(' from tlIt' 
striking d(w('lopmt'nls in It'l'hnology 
whieh have incrt'asingly permitted 
man's penetration beneath the seas -
a technology which has had to over· 
come the obstacles of an environment 
prrhaps more akin to that on thc sur-
face of a neighboring planet than on 
the surface of our own earth - airless, 
wet, cold, opaque, and corrosive, with 
rxtremc pressur('s. You arc prohably 
familiar with many of ti)('S(' develop· 
ments. We see broad advances in the 
trchnology of marine mining and 
marinc structures which have permit-
tt'd maint('nance of fixed and s('miprr-
mallt'nt marine installations and III!' 
commercial extraction of oil and othl'r 
r('sources from th(' seabed and subsoil. 
The nuclear submarine is a basic foun-
dation of our modern Navy. More than 
20 tethered or free· moving manned 
drrp sea submergence systems have 
been developed for research, rescur, 
and recovery, and we are gaining new 
experience with remote control under-
water manipulator or robot systems as 
that used for the recovery of the nu-
clear bomb off Spain. Other develop. 
nwnts include surface and d('('p oeran 
hlloy tt'chnology capahle of recorcling 
and tdrmeterin~ information to ship, 
shor(', or ~ateJJjt(· inslallations; im· 
I'rov('c1 ehartillg or the' dl'(,p l'l'as and 
Iheir ('urrl'nts; and navigational and 
Jlol'itional tt'chnology permitting loca-
tion_ idl'ntification_ and relation to 
ohjr('lg in thr undl'rs('a rnvironnll'nt. 
Finally. thrre art' various trdmologi-
1.'al advances prrmitting human beings 
10 lin' and work as frer swimmers un-
c1<'r5ras. as illustrated by scuba systems 
ancl l'aturation diving trchniqucs, thr 
Na\'y'l' "Mun in III(' Sl'a" program and 
Spala" r. IT, ancl I If rX(lc'rim('ntl'. ancl 
1'IilI ('arl), rc'l'par('h on "artificial ~ilk" 
,nIh 11\('5r IIch·an('rs hal' cmnr II Irl'-
IIIl'lIdou;; UpgUrgl' ill awan'I\l'::s of Ihl' 
potrntial importance and riches of the 
marinr cnvironment. 
Thus, the development of the Polaris 
undersea weapons system, with its 
virtues or concealmcnt, mobility, and 
dil'persion, has dearly greatly affected 
stratc'gic thinking; in fact, in June 
1966 thr Pand on Oceanography of the 
Pre!';drnt's Scirncr Advisory Commit-
trr statrd that "thr most urgrnt aspect 
of Fc'clc'ral involvemrnt in ocran sciencr 
and technology for the next 5 to 10 
years relates to national security in the 
narrow, strictly military srnse." 
Again, in an age in which thl' threat 
of overpopulation has hrcome a proll-
lrm rivaling that of nuclear weapons 
and in which som(' ohl'rrvt'rs prt'dict a 
collapsr of tht' world's food economy 
within 20 years_ the possibility of in-
crt'asing utilization of the vast and 
thus far largrly unrxploited potential 
food rrsourct's of the seas has acquired 
grt'at significance. Some believe our 
ability to dt've1op marine sources of 
food may he indispensable to the main-
trnance of long run world social, eco-
nomie, and political stability. 
The great mineral wealth of the sea 
- oil, coal, sulfur, iron, manganese, 
and diamonds and as a source for 
desalinated water - is being increas-
ingly exploited with potentially impor-
tant eITects on a number of national 
513 
economics. For example, in addition 
to the rapic! dt'vdopmrnt of ofTshorr 
oil and mineral extraction in thc 
United Statrs. important cnergy 
sources are bring developed in the 
North Sea, and Australia, among other 
countries, has discovered important off-
shore mineral deposits. 
Tht' advanlagrs of large cargo sub-
marinrs, frrl' or surface wind and 
weather. operating. for ('xample. undrr 
tl\(' Arctic ice between Europe and 
Asia have brrn pointed out. WI' have 
IH'gun to appreriatC' Ihr potrntially 
profound rfTt'cts of our growing pollu-
tion of the oceans - a problem drama-
tized by the Torre Canyon incident and 
the question of disposal of radioactive 
waste. Finally, the possible uses of the 
OCt'aIl'S tides for power, as in the pro-
posed Passamaquoddy Dam project, 
and tIll' grC'at eITect of the oceans on 
weather and the problem of weather 
control arc being explored. 
Even a bricf survcy of these develop-
ments suggt'sts a science-fiction future 
where man's food comes largely from 
ocean algae farms, whale herds, and 
fish ranges "fenced" by bubble' or 
sonic harriers, where national security 
is hascd on underwater submarine or 
missile hast'S, perhaps constantly 
shiftrd ahout the ocean floor to a\·oid 
dett'ction; wht'rc mt'n may ultimately 
e,·en live and work in cities beneath 
the sea. 
This ncw significanct' of the 'ocean 
is, in turn, forcing a reassessment by 
states of their national interests and 
attitudes - a reassessment perhaps 
symbolizt'd in our own country by 
Congressional passagc last year of the 
Marinc Resourcrs and Engineering De-
velopment Act and the fact that, by 
my information, over 15 intragovern-
mental committees are now working on 
ocean development prohlems. Whilc the 
sea was principally viewed as a high-
way. thc doctrine of freedom of the 
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sC'as, of nonexclusive use, had a broad 
appeal. ThC' national interest {'aeh stat{' 
had in frC'1' navigation of tlw sC'as hy 
its own ships without interf{'rC'nre by 
oth{'r countries gem'rally outweighed 
the limited gains a state might hope to 
derive from its own assertion of exclu-
sive control on the seas. However, 
whrr{' nonsharable or competing uses 
dC'\'l'lop - as wilh the exploitation of 
mitwral wC'alth or fish{'ril's - a strong 
national int{'rest in asserting para-
mOllnt or exclusivC' control of these 
1lii'C'S I'II1{'rgl's. Mor{'ovC'r, whC'fl' the 
potential eff{'cts of high s{'as activity 
on shore states hecome more signifi-
cant or are more profoundly realized 
- as with the prohl{'m or unders{'a 
Wl'apons systems or polllltion-pr{'ssure 
to protect national interests hy assC'rt-
ing authority on the high seas mounts. 
One illustration of this tendency is, 
of course, the many attempts by statrs 
to control fishing in their offshore high 
seas waters, for example, our own P.L. 
89-658, enacted last year, asserts the 
right of the UnitC'd States to control 
fishing in a contiguous zone 9 miles 
out from the limits of our t{'rritorial 
sea. But more significant for our pur-
pose are developments concerning the 
continental shelf. 
The real takeoff of this development 
was our own Truman Declaration of 
1945 which proclaimrd that the United 
States regards the natural rl'sources of 
the suhsoil and s{'alll'd of thl' contig-
IIOUS continental shl'lf as appertaining 
to the United States and suhject to its 
jurisdiction and control. While a t{'r-
ritorial claim to the shelf was deliber-
atd}" avoided and it was made clear 
rights of navigation in thl' superjac{'nt 
seas wen' not aff{'cted, our assertion of 
jurisdiction over the shelf itself was 
\"ery far-reaching. The U.S. declaration 
was follow{'d in !'hort order hy similar 
declarations hy many othrr stat{'s with 
continental slw\v{'s. Finally, in 1958. 
tIl(' principle of allocating virtually {'x-
c\u!'i,,{' rights to th{' u~{' of rrsources 
of the rontill{'ntal ~hdf to the contig-
uous shore statl' was, in rffrr!. ratifird 
hy thr Grneva COllwntion on tIl{' Con· 
tinC'ntal Shelf to whirh some RO statC's 
arr now party. 
Unckr the ContinC'ntai Sh{'lf Con-
\'C'ntion Ih{' coastal state eXl'rci~C's sovC'r-
I'i:rn ri:rhts o\'C'r tIl(' rontirwnlal slwlf 
for Ihl' plIl'po!'e of I'xploring it alHI 1'\-
ploilin!! il:, nalural 1'e1'O\l1'('I'1'. \I0WI'\'I'I'. 
Illl'>:e righl>: do nol afTI'd thl' 1I'!!al 
!'lalll1' of Ill\' !'IIPI'1'j:H'1'1l1 \I all'1'>: a:; 
high s{'as or thaI of Ilw ail'sparl' ullll\ (' 
waters, The rights to the resources of 
thl' shelf do not depend on occupation 
or expr('~s proclamation and are ex-
c\usiv<, in th{' sen~e that if thr coastal 
state does not explore the continental 
shl'lf or exploit its natural r('somcrs no 
onc I'ls<' may und('rtake these activities 
or make a claim to the continental shelf 
without the expressed consent of the 
coastal state, The com,tal state may not 
unjustifiahly intl'rfere with navigation, 
fishing, or the conservation of living 
r('sources of the sea, or scientific re-
search. However, the coastal state is 
entitled to install and maintain or 
operate on the continental shelf installa-
tions and other devices necessary for 
the exploration and exploitation of its 
natural resources and may establish 
safety zones around such installations, 
not to exceed 500 meters in hreadth. 
Th(· n('gotiating history of th{' Conven-
tion sUl!g<'sts that there is no clear 
har to the placement of defense instal-
lalions on the continental shelf hy the 
shore state. 
It is important to note that the defi-
nition of continental shelf given in the 
Convention is not what a geologist's 
definition might be (assuming geolo-
gists could agree) and is specifically 
oprn <'nded; it is defined as "the sea 
b<,d and subsoil of the submarine areas 
adjac<'nt to thl' coast .. , to a depth of 
200 mrl('rs or. heyond that limit, to 
whC'rt, tl\(, d('pth of the superjaccnt 
wa!t'rs admit of the exploitation of the 
natural rrsources." Thus, while the 
Convention establishcs a reasonably 
d('ar regime for the continental shelves 
thrmsrlves, giving rulemaking author· 
ity to the coastal statc, it is left unclear 
prrrisrly wherr that sort of rcgime 
rnel::;. Pre::;lImahly such exdu!;ivr claims 
It n' :rood ai- h'a::;t ::;omr e!islatlCl' hl'yone! 
1111' 20()·1l1l'1I'r linl' or "lsI' 1111' "I'xploiln-
hilit y.' C'rill'ria wouldn't hav(' hrrl1 
addl'l!. On 1111' ollll'r hand. a ("onn'nlion 
d('alin~ wilh Ihe coulinl'nlal slH'1f ('ouhl 
not easily hc argued to resolve quc::;-
tiOIl!; of jurisdiction in zones having 
littlC' rrlal ion to the continrntal shC'lf. 
particularly wll('Tl' the alternativc 200· 
mrtrr drpth was provided. 
Since drilling ean now be done in as 
much m; 1,000-foot depths and thc 
Unitl'cl Statl's has already leasee! min· 
C'ral rights in arC'as of drpths of over 
'1.0(H) f('('1 - dl'vrlopmrnts not for('seen 
hy the draftC'rs of the Convcntion -
trouhlC'some probl('m!; of interpr('tation 
ar(' aln'ue!y arising. An intC'r('!;ting ex-
amplr of Ihi::; prohll'm i::; the n'portee! 
rre('nt attrmpt by some San Dirgo 
hu::;itl('ssmrn to estahlish thr so-callre! 
n('w nation of Ahalonia. The plan was 
to ('stahlish an artificial island by sink-
ing a ('on('r('tc reinforcrd ship in 12 
(rrt of watt'r· on Cortrs Bank. which 
1iC'::; 110 mill'S off San DiC'go. The issu(' 
arOSl' wlll'tlll'r U.S. authority une!C'r thl' 
contitl('ntal sheff legislation extended to 
tIl(' hank, sincc tIl(' water between the 
hank ane! thC' mainland rrached depths 
of over 1,100 meters. Unfortunately for 
Irftal scholarship, a storm drove the 
ship off tIl(' hank and it sank in deep 
watcr, so the question is still open. As 
another illustration of these developing 
problems, last March Denmark, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands submitted 
to the World Court a dispute hetwern 
thrm ('onceming thr delimitation of 
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thr eontin!'ntal sh!'1f of the North Sea. 
Assuming thnt the Contin('ntal Shrlf 
Convrntion is limited to at least the 
morc shallow areas of thr s('as adjacrnt 
to the continrnts, we arc still faced with 
the qurstions of where the precise limit 
of thr regime of the .continental shdf 
is and who may establish rules for 
a('livities in the deep sea heyond those 
shallow rrgions. We may soon srI) thi!; 
prohlt'm raisC'd in a nuil'ly of prartieal 
cont('xts. For ('xample: 
Could the Unitrd Stales pro· 
hihit or control thc activitirs of 
an English or somc other foreign 
company seeking to extract min-
rrals from the scahrd or subsoil 
just b('yond the limits of our 
gC'ologicalIy defined Atlantic con-
lilH'ntal shelf and at greater than 
200 mC'ter drpths? 
What about Russian construc-
tion of an undersea missile basc 
just outsidC' our shrlf or, for that 
matter, its permanent stationing 
of a fie!'t o[ missile submarines in 
our offshore waters? 
If it (I.S. company discovers 
and begins C'xploitation of the 
resources of a seamount in the 
mid-Atlantic, i~ there any way it 
can prevent other U.S. or foreign 
rompanirs from rushing in to 
shan' its find - for. clearly, if 
sOl11e ml'asure of exclusivity is 
not possible, ~uch C'xploration 
and development may not be 
commerciall y feasible? 
What crlminal and private 
laws wiII regulate the conduct of 
individuals on U.S. or foreign 
fixed installations on or under 
the high seas? For example, sup-
pose a U.S. scuba diver kills a 
French scuba diver in the process 
of !;!'('king discoverir.!; beneath 
the high ~('as? 
How will tIll' iJ1('vitahle con-
fljets hrtween thC' traditional usrs 
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of til!' s('a for navigation and 
fishing and the various new un-
drrseas uses hE' resolved ? For in-
stance, can a Texas tower hc built 
or a fixed or free-floating buoy 
system put in operation even 
though they may create hazards 
to ships? It is interesting to note 
that in thc GuJ£ of Mexico it has 
prowd lll'('essary to estahlish 
Shipping Safl·ty Fairways to 
avoid dangers of ('olIision with 
sm·h permanent installations. 
IIow can a country stop an-
other country from taking one of 
its huoys or extracting its in-
formation? 
What ahout damage to fishing 
eaused by pollution or other hy-
products from undersea mining 
activities? 
Can the United States restrict 
trawling, the disposal of radio-
active materials, or undcrwater 
C'xplosions in til(' vicinity of U.S. 
opC'rated subsurface installations, 
and can it enforce such regula-
tions against foreign nationals? 
What if a government or pri-
,'ate individuals use modern tech-
nology to herd fish from the high 
seas into exclusive contiguous 
fishing zones? 
And so on! As we have seen, there are 
various approa('h('s onc could take to 
provide solutions for thC's(! prohlelm;. 
First, we could say that all of the 
high seas, including its depths, bed, 
and suhsoil r('main res communis anel 
open to all with no possibility of uni-
lateral claims to exclusivc usc; con-
s('qucntly, ('ach statl' will typically con-
trol only its own nationals, enterprises, 
or installations. Ohviously, assuming 
that such a doctrin(' wonld still lPgally 
p('rmit unilateral ('xploitation to he 
carri('d on, it would still appear to fur-
nish litth' protection to nations or 
finns initiating mining or other de-
wlopnl!'ntal activiti('s; as soon as th(' 
dp\"dopnwnt showpd promisp, poarlH'rs 
might com(' in. Hational planning of 
deep spas usps would he impossihl(' 
without soni(' ovt'rruling intrrnational 
undl·rstandings. 
S('col1<l, we could extend the contin-
('ntal slwH principle to the oc('an dl'(,ps. 
elidding rights on SOIll(' sort of sl'('tor 
Ih('ory I)('t\\'('('n littoral slat(·s. Bul slll'h 
diyil:ipn ha~('d on a('dd('nls of !!;(·ogra· 
phy n'aHy unn·lall'd to rpal ('onsid('ra-
I-ions of contiguity would hI' highly 
inequitablC' and extremely complC'x. 
States whom geography did not favor 
would cC'rtainly not accept it. 
Third. WI' could say that th(' hed and 
suhsoil of tlw dl'l'll ocC'an is /rrra 1lul-
lius - whorvcr can e/TI·(·tivdy ('xploit 
and ('ontrol it ('an claim l'xdusivl! 
rights. This doctrinC', of course, would 
\t'ad to que·stions as to what constitull'd 
such e/Tertivc occupation and possibly 
a racl' I)(·tw(·rn thr United Statrs, the 
SO\'ipt lin ion. and thr f('w othrr t('('h-
no logically capable statC's to graIl the 
depths for thrmselves. Prrsidcnt John-
son voiced this concern last year when 
he warned: "Under no circumstances 
... must we ever allow the prospects of 
rich harvest and mineral wealth to 
create a new form of colonial competi-
tion among thE' maritime nations. We 
must he careful to avoid a race to 
gra::p and to hold thr lands undrr th(' 
high s('as. We nlll::;l in::un' that the 
deep S('as and the oc('an bottoms are, 
and rrmain, tIl{' lrgacy of all human 
IJl'ings." Some Government depart-
ments may he having second thoughts 
about the hreadth of this statement! 
Fourth, we could collectively agrer, 
as suggested hy last summ('r's World 
Pracr Through Law Conference at 
G('n('va. I hat till' T('sonrCI'S of thr orl'p 
spas "p(,rtain" to tIll' Unit(·d Natiolls 
and let th(' Unitrd Nations makr tIll' 
applicahlE' rules for the exploitation of 
such resources and allocation of their 
helwfitl'. I underl'tand that a proposal 
to this ('/T('ct il' Iwing plac('d on the 
current U.N. General Assembly agenda. 
But do Wt' really place that much eon-
fid('n("(' in the wisdom of present U.N. 
G('nenll Al's(,lllbly majorities? Do we 
wllnt to hurden deep s('a d('v('lopm('nt 
\\ ith a Unit('c1 Nations hur('aucracy? 
Would tlll'r(' he any r('al inc'l'ntive for 
cll'\'I'lo(lnll'nt IJIld('r 1'1It'h a l') l'tl'llI'? 
Fifth. WI' ("ould dc·\'C'lo(l :111 y 0 f a 
\'aridy of pOl'l'ihl(, tY(lI'S of IWW inter-
national organizations tailored to m('('t 
th(' !'p('cial problems of thc deep l'eal' 
and with sj>eciaf rule~aking, adminis· 
trativ(', f('gistration, or licrnsing pow-
ers to provide for rational development. 
For cxample, a statc or a private com· 
pany might he granted exclusivt' ex-
ploitation rightl' to a Iimit('d an'a upon 
r('gist('ring the area with such an inter-
national ag('ney and proving its capaci· 
ty to actually carry out such exploita. 
tion and comply with navigational 
saf('ty and pollution standards. The 
grante(' might be r('quired to pay a 
p('rc('ntage of its profits into a common 
international fund for economic devel-
opm('nt or other purposes. It is worth 
noting that there are already a great 
number of international organizations 
('np:ag('d in cooperation in the ocean-
ographic fi('ld; for ('xample, th(' Inter-
national IHnritinl(' Conl'ultativ(' Orp:an-
iimtion is a('tively !"tudying the Torn! 
Cml)wl. pro""'Ill. And, of courl'(" WI' 
nlr('ady have conventions in force ap· 
plieabl(' to a fl'w of these dr('p !"ea 
prohl('ms - for ('xamplt., the Oil Pollu-
tion Convention or the 1963 Test Ban 
Trenty prohibiting nuclear tests in the 
sea. 
Finally, we could combine various 
approaches, using each to solve the 
kinds of problems to which it was brst 
suited - for example, letting each 
l'tate provide civil and criminal law for 
its own installations but perhaps with 
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international rrgistry of the installa· 
tions themselves. 
We also ha\'e an additional question 
to answer. Should we try to resolve 
th('se problems now hy specific inter-
national agreelll('nt? Or should WI' in· 
stead adopt a go.slow, wait-and·s('e 
approach prrmitting th(' probl('ms to 
IlI,ltl'r drfine themsrlves h('fore attempt-
ing an ov('rall solution. r('stricting our-
SI'I \'('s to pral'lica I il'l'ul'!" as tlwy :tris(', 
pl'rhaps IPlting answers dl'vdop hy tIl«' 
push and pull of national interl'sts de· 
veloping into customary law? 
This is the shape of the problem, 
and, I think, as yet no one really knows 
what answers will ultimately be given. 
As we'v(' seen, the rules that emerge 
will doubtl('ss he some sort of compro· 
mil'r, the n'sultant of the interaction of 
statc int(,l'l'sts weighted by the influ-
enc(' of the states concerned and their 
willingness to exert that influence. But 
foreign offices are not yet really sure 
where their interests lie in this new 
area, so they are reluctant to commit 
themselves one way or the other. For 
example, at the moment a legal regime 
based on the terra nullius concept of 
"finders keepers" might seem in the 
U.S. interest since our technology ap-
pears to give us an edge in any race 
for undersea territory. But what of the 
Hu:;;.o;ians? And what arc tIle long-term 
('osts of su('h an approoeh? Should the 
lInitl'd Stat('s s('c'k a rule which pre· 
v('nts Sovi('t missile suhs from np' 
proaching our own coasts even if the 
rule restricts the flexibility of our own 
Polaris submarines? As naval offieC'rs, 
(10 you rl'al1y have sufficient informa· 
tion to now say which rule you would 
prefer? 
The complexity of these problems is 
such that I gladly leave a discussion of 
their solution in the more capable 
hands of Admiral Hearn. I will restrict 
myself to only three comments. 
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First, admittedly premature attempts-
to deal with ill·defined problems may 
be undesirable. However, there seems 
to be also a risk in letting the legal 
problems of the deep seas drift too long 
wilhout ohtaining at least some broad 
g('n('ral int('rnational understandings as 
to the shape of the legal regime we 
contemplate. History suggests that at 
some point opposing national interests 
and ('ommilmrnts in such matters may 
1)('('on1(' ~o f rOlwn Ihat a mutually agree· 
nhl(' lIn<1 ralionnl :;olulion i:; no longer 
possible. Thus, it can 1)(' argued that 
we waited too long in the area of con· 
trol of nuclear weapons; conversely, 
prrhaps we acted just in time in our 
early formulation of the Outer Space 
Ti"raty. Against the argument that our 
national interest is not yet clear and 
do('s not yet permit us to decide what 
legal regime for the high seas will 
prove most advantageous must be 
w('ighed th(' argument that what we can 
get now may be better than what will 
be possihle later on. 
Second, it seems to me unlikely that 
the other nations of the world will 
acquiesce in a de facto division of the 
resources of the high seas among the 
few states, such as the United States 
and the Soviet Union, now alone 
capable of exploring and exploiting 
them. I think we will see a growing 
«rmand for some form of international 
regulation assuring a broader sharing 
of tIl(' hrnefits which will flow from 
thrse developments - a pressure which 
the United States, given the curr('nt 
state of international affairs, will find 
it hard to n·sist. Thus. it would not he 
~urprisillg to -see some broad statement 
soon emerge from the U.N. General 
Asspmbly rrserving the seabeds and 
suhsoil to tIll' use of all mankind and 
rxcluding national trrritorial claims -
a statemrnt based on thr precedent of 
the Outer Spacr Declaration and 
Treaty. On the other hand, I believe it 
highly unlikdy that the gr('at pow('r~ 
would prest'ntly consent to gin' 10 Ill(' 
United Nations. or to any similarly 
constituted international agency, any 
substantial or meaningful oprrational. 
control over their deep sea activitirs. 
Third, thr most likrly devdopnwnl. 
I brlirve, is that we will see a function· 
al approach leading to the use of a val" 
i('ty of legal trchniqurs to handlr the 
~p('eial I<·gal prohlems of tIl!' <1('(-P spa:::. 
For ('xample·. r SU~I1l'('t we' will han- It 
hroad Oull-r Spat·(, Tn-nty type' insl1'll' 
mrnt harring national trrrilorial 
claims. As to practical jurisdictional 
questions, states will probably simply 
extend customary international law 
principles r('cognizing national juris. 
diction ov('r their ve~sc1s to national 
control of activitips on their d('ep sra 
installations as weII, and such jurisdic· 
tion will he generally recognized; the 
United Statrs and the Netherlands have 
already tak('n strps along thrsr lin('s. 
Perhaps international custom will also 
lrad to a broad principle of noninter· 
ference with purely scientific drrp seas 
rrsearch. On the other hand, special 
agreements may be progressively de· 
vdoped on an ad hoc basis to deal with 
the many other problems we have seen 
- an agreement giving some protec· 
tion to particular types of mining ac· 
tivities; an agreement for the registry 
and regulation of permaent installa· 
tions and fixed and free·floating buoys; 
an agrerment on drep oc('an pollution; 
possibly even an arms control agree· 
ment relating to underseas weapons 
systems. 
Pt'rhaps if III('rr is one lrsson in this 
survey it is that the provision of Ill'W 
law for this new environment will in 
itself be an advrnture - a creative 
rather than a mrchanical act. Wc sec 
that law, and particularly international 
law, ('an best he viewed as simply a 
1001 which mt'n haw developed to 1ioh·c 
thE' problems which arise from group 
Iivinl! - a tool which is pllrposi\'r and 
fllnrtionnl. Appral to thr past, to prrcc-
c1rnt_ ancl so-railed doctrine cannot 
alonl' l1nswrr the new questions we are 
faring. Wr srr that, particularly in the 
intl'rnationaI fidd whrre the force of 
rlllrs is pr(,lIliarIy dependent on thr 
al'rl'ptance by the states to which thcy 
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an' addressed, law must reflect work-
ahk ('ompromisrs among various statr 
inh'n'"I" and pro\'illr ::;rnsihlt, an::;w('TS 
10 n'al prohlt'lIl" if il i" 10 Ill' nH'aning-
fill and I'fTI'I'\;n'. Thl' IlI'xl fl'w }"l'a .. !' 
will !'how whl'lhl'r WI' ("an mrl'\ this 
challenge in lhr nl'w worlds which arC' 
oprning to us. 
----'f!----
